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Making the Child Care
Tax Credit Permanently
Refundable Could Beneft
Low-Income Families
Gabrielle Pepin
Te Child and Dependent Care
Credit (CDCC), a tax credit based
on income and child care expenses,
subsidizes child care costs for working
families. Te federal CDCC is available
to households with children younger
than 13 in which all parents have
positive annual earnings. While many
families meet these criteria, from its
introduction in 1976 through 2020,
the CDCC was nonrefundable, so
only families with positive tax liability
afer other deductions benefted. Tis
generally precluded very-low-income
families from receiving CDCC benefts,
and many policymakers advocated
making the credit refundable. In
response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
the American Rescue Plan Act of
2021 made the CDCC refundable and
increased its generosity during tax
year 2021 only. I estimate how CDCC
eligibility, benefts, and marginal tax
rates would change for diferent groups
if the credit were made permanently
refundable.

Using data from the Survey of
Income and Program Participation,
which documents income,
demographics, and child care expenses
of U.S. households, I fnd that making
the CDCC permanently refundable
would lead to relatively large increases
in eligibility among single-parent,
Black, and Hispanic households,
which are all less likely to qualify for
the nonrefundable credit. Specifcally,
some 3 percent of Black households, 2
percent of Hispanic households, and
1 percent of white households would
gain eligibility, all else equal. About
5 percent of single parents would
gain eligibility and receive on average
over $1,000 in benefts annually. Tis
increase is substantial, constituting
18 percent of existing child care
spending and 10 percent of adjusted
gross income (AGI). Nevertheless,
refundability would generate small
increases in marginal tax rates for some
moderate-income taxpayers. Making
the CDCC permanently refundable

ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS
n The Child and Dependent Care Credit (CDCC) subsidizes child care costs for working families.
n In 2021, the CDCC was made temporarily refundable, so even families with no
positive tax liability after other deductions could benefit.
n If refundability were made permanent, around 5 percent of single parents would
gain eligibility and receive on average over $1,000 per year in benefits.
n Permanent refundability would also lead to large increases in eligibility among
Black and Hispanic households.
n Some moderate-income taxpayers would experience small increases in marginal
tax rates.

would increase government spending
each year by about $800 million, or 21
percent of CDCC spending during the
late 2010s.

How Does the CDCC Work?

Congress implemented the CDCC
in 1976 and expanded it in 1981 and
2001. Te latter expansion took efect
in 2003, and between 2003 and 2020,
households were able to claim up to
$3,000 worth of child care expenses
per year for each of up to two children
younger than 13. Such households
could receive a tax credit worth up to

If the CDCC were made
permanently refundable,
low-income taxpayers would
receive larger benefts.
35 percent of those expenses, up to
$1,050 per child. Beginning at $15,000
in AGI, the beneft rate decreased by
1 percentage point for each additional
$2,000 until it remained at 20 percent
for those with $43,000 or more in AGI,
who could receive up to $600 per child
in benefts. Te CDCC, however, was
nonrefundable, so taxpayers without
positive tax liability were ineligible.
Moreover, CDCC claimants must
work to qualify for benefts, including
both spouses among married taxpayers
fling jointly. Additionally, if either
spouse’s earnings are less than child
care expenditures, the CDCC is capped
by the pay of the lower-earning spouse.
Almost any child care expenditures
are eligible for the credit, except care
provided by a noncustodial parent,
but to claim the credit, taxpayers
must list their earnings, child care
expenditures, and child care providers’
tax identifcation or Social Security
numbers.

How Would Permanent Refundability
Afect CDCC Eligibility and Benefts?
Nonrefundability generates a
diference between statutory and
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actual benefts received. In Figure
1, I compare maximum efective
CDCC benefts with and without
refundability as of 2020.1 Taxpayers’
incomes must exceed the tax fling
threshold of $18,650 to be eligible for
nonrefundable benefts. For taxpayers
with incomes above this threshold,
nonrefundable benefts (red lines)
increase with income before reaching
peaks of about $860 at $27,600 in
AGI for households with one eligible
child and $1,530 at $34,100 in AGI for
households with two or more eligible
children. Benefts then decrease until
they plateau at $600 per child for
taxpayers with $43,000 or more in
income.
Figure 1 also shows that if the
CDCC were made permanently
refundable (blue lines), low-income
taxpayers would receive larger benefts.
For very-low-income taxpayers,
refundable benefts increase as income
increases and then hold steady at
$1,050 per child at incomes up to

$15,000. For taxpayers with AGI
above $15,000, refundable benefts
steadily fall as income increases until
they converge with nonrefundable
benefts. Hence, making the CDCC
permanently refundable would
increase generosity among low-income
taxpayers without afecting benefts for
those with higher incomes.

How Would Permanent Refundability
Afect Work Decisions?

As a subsidy for child care,
CDCC benefts encourage child care
spending and efectively increase
wages net of child care costs. Since all
parents must work to receive benefts,
increases in benefts promote labor
force participation. However, the
CDCC generates complex work hours
incentives. To examine how making the
CDCC permanently refundable would
afect work hours, I compare marginal
tax rates with respect to income—the
taxes that parents would owe on an
additional dollar of income—with

Figure 1 Maximum Federal CDCC Benefts by Federal AGI
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NOTE: The fgure shows expected federal CDCC benefts for households with one (dashed line) or two or more
(solid line) eligible children as of 2020. The maximum credit with refundability is shown in blue and without
refundability is shown in red.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using federal tax forms.

6

and without refundability. When
marginal tax rates increase, the value
of an additional dollar of earnings
falls, which discourages parents from
working more.
Figure 2 displays these marginal
tax rates for households with the
maximum qualifying child care
expenditures as of 2020.2 Panel A,
which shows marginal tax rates for
single parents with one eligible child,
indicates that making the CDCC
permanently refundable would
decrease marginal tax rates by 35
percentage points for those with less
than $3,000 in AGI. (Marginal tax
rates are already negative in this range,
implying that an additional dollar of
earnings is worth more than a dollar
because of the credit.) Refundability
would not afect marginal tax rates
for single parents between incomes
of $3,000 and $15,000, but it would
increase rates by 1.5 percentage points
between incomes of $15,000 and
$25,000 and by 11.5 percentage points
between incomes of $25,000 and
$33,000.
Marginal tax rates for married
parents with two eligible children,
depicted in Panel B of Figure 2, exhibit
a similar pattern. Tus, a permanently
refundable CDCC would reduce
marginal tax rates for households
with very low incomes, incentivizing
increases in their work hours, but
it would increase marginal tax rates
for households with low to moderate
incomes, discouraging their work
hours.

As refundability has diferent
impacts on tax rates across the
income distribution, which
households would likely beneft from
a permanently refundable CDCC?
To answer the question, I simulate
impacts of refundability, drawing
on the 2018 Survey of Income and
Program Participation for taxpayer
characteristics and child care spending
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23 percent are ineligible for the
nonrefundable CDCC, another 23
percent fall in the phase-in region of
the CDCC, where benefts increase as
income rises, and the remaining 54
percent fall in the phase-out/plateau
region of the credit, where benefts
decrease or remain constant as income
rises. Households in the ineligible and
phase-in regions on average spend
about $6,000 and $11,000 per year,

low to qualify for the nonrefundable
CDCC but would become eligible if
refundability led them to pay for child
care. Tese results suggest permanent
CDCC refundability would decrease
eligibility gaps between whites and
underrepresented groups.
Permanent refundability would also
change beneft amounts for diferent
families. Among single parents who
work and already pay for child care,

Figure 2 Marginal Tax Rates for Diferent Families by CDCC Refundability
Panel A: Single with One Child
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Panel B: Married with Two Children
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among households with children
younger than 13. Te data allow me
to estimate CDCC eligibility rates by
family structure and race and observe
how permanent refundability would
afect CDCC benefts and marginal
tax rates across households that face
diferent child care and labor supply
incentives.
I fnd that 15 percent of single
parents and 19 percent of married
parents are eligible for nonrefundable
CDCC benefts. About 5 percent of
single parents have incomes too low to
qualify for the nonrefundable benefts
but would become eligible if the credit
were made permanently refundable.
Another 56 percent of single parents
would gain eligibility if refundability
led them to pay for child care. Te
remaining 25 percent of single parents
do not work and have incomes too
low to qualify for the nonrefundable
CDCC. Among married parents,
10 percent have incomes too low to
qualify for the nonrefundable CDCC,
but virtually none of these households
pay for child care and therefore would
remain ineligible under a refundable
credit. Most married parents are
ineligible for the CDCC because they
do not pay for child care or one of the
parents does not work.
CDCC eligibility rates also vary
by parents’ race and ethnicity. Black
and Hispanic households, which tend
to have lower incomes, are less likely
than white households to be eligible for
the nonrefundable CDCC. Whereas
21 percent of white households are
eligible, only 17 percent of Black
households and 13 percent of Hispanic
households are eligible. Making the
CDCC permanently refundable
would increase eligibility by about
3 percentage points among Black
households, by about 2 percentage
points among Hispanic households,
and by about 1 percentage point among
white households. Another 14 percent
of Black households, 8 percent of
Hispanic households, and 7 percent
of white households have incomes too
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NOTE: The fgure shows marginal tax rates with respect to AGI under the federal CDCC, Child Tax Credit, Earned
Income Tax Credit, and federal individual income tax schedule as of 2020, assuming the CDCC is nonrefundable
or refundable.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using TAXSIM and federal tax forms.
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respectively, on child care. If the CDCC
were made permanently refundable,
average annual benefts would increase
from $0 to $1,037 in the ineligible
region and from $617 to $1,249 in the
phase-in region. Tese increases are
substantial: in the ineligible region,
the increase constitutes 18 percent of
existing child care spending and 10
percent of AGI. In the phase-in region,
it constitutes 6 percent of child care
spending and 3 percent of AGI.
Tese beneft increases also afect
marginal tax rates. In the ineligible
region, the average marginal tax rate
on an additional dollar of income
would fall by 5 percentage points under
refundability, while in the phase-in
and phase-out/plateau regions it would
rise by about 2 percentage points.
However, the benefts also subsidize
the cost of child care, efectively
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making it cheaper. For households
in the ineligible region, the efective
(postsubsidy) cost of an additional
dollar of child care spending decreases
by 16 percent. In the phase-in and
phase-out/plateau regions, the cost
decreases by 9 and 4 cents on the
dollar, respectively. Tus, moderateincome households have slightly higher
marginal tax rates on their incomes
ofset by cheaper child care costs, with
the latter possibly mitigating work
disincentives caused by the former.

How Would Permanent Refundability
Afect Government Spending?

Finally, CDCC beneft increases
under refundability would increase
government spending. If all households
with beneft increases were to claim
the CDCC, making it permanently
refundable would increase government

spending annually by about $800
million, or about 22 percent of total
CDCC spending in the late 2010s.
Notes
1. I assume single taxpayers fle as head-ofhousehold, married taxpayers fle jointly,
and all income comes from earnings among
very-low-income taxpayers.
2. I assume households do not have older
children, all income comes from earnings,
and married parents have equal earnings,
though results are similar for married
parents with unequal earnings.
For additional details, see the working
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/
up_workingpapers/344.

Gabrielle Pepin is a postdoctoral researcher at the
Upjohn Institute.

Inviting Submissions for the 2021 Dissertation Award
Te W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research invites
submissions for its 27th annual prize
for the best PhD dissertation on
employment-related issues.
A frst prize of $2,500 is being
ofered. Up to two honorable mention
awards of $1,000 may also be given.
Te Institute supports and conducts
policy-relevant research on issues
related to employment, unemployment,
and social insurance programs. Te
dissertation award furthers this
mission. Te dissertation may come
from any academic discipline, but it
must have a substantial policy focus.
Dissertations will be evaluated by a
panel of economists using the following
criteria:
• Policy relevance
• Technical quality of the research
• Presentation
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Any person whose dissertation has
been accepted during the 24-month
period from July 1, 2019 to June 30,
2021 is eligible for the 2021 prize.
Te deadline for submission is July
5, 2021. Applicants must upload a 10page summary of the dissertation, CV,
and a letter of endorsement from their
dissertation advisor at: https://www
.upjohn.org/form/dissertation-award.
Applicants are advised that they will
need to supply a copy of their entire
dissertation if they are selected as a
fnalist, and they may apply for the
award only once.
Additional information may
be obtained by contacting us at
communications@upjohn.org.
Information is also available at https://
www.upjohn.org/about/grants-awards/
dissertation-award.
Visit https://research.upjohn.org/
dissertation_awards/ for a complete
list

of award winners and summaries of
their dissertations.
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